I copied one paragraph and replaced some bits. Does it sound correct ?
The Ameirican banking system (circa 2008) needs to stop thinking about foreign capital - and the foreign investors (Japan, Germany etc.) behind it - as marks to be ripped off and dumb money to plug gaps (in "AAA" rated junk MBS, CDO etc). It might be fun to stick foreigners with the losses from Countrywide mortgage (goldman's Abacus CDO etc.), but............
I hope i have not misunderstood anything. But yeah, i get that the dragon is no match for the eagle for lots of good reasons, many of which you have mentioned.
I'm speaking about the distinction between onshore and offshore debt holders. In the examples you sighted, foreign investors saw the same losses as domestic investors in those products, and in many cases the senior bond holders often took losses.
Further, foreign investors ended up taking stakes in the failed financial institutions in the manner I describe in the post. The banks were recapped as a result.
Meanwhile, Evergrande's onshore debt still hasn't been written down.
Wouldn't the US be better off if they were not the issuer of the reserve currency and still maintain open capital markets? Doesn't the reserve currency create a form of 'dutch disease' for their manufacturing sector? Or is the reserve currency status something that cannot be controlled because like you say it is a matter of trust and network effects that the US cannot control? Cheers.
Thoroughly enjoyed this mate, good read can feel how deeply you've considered this and the writing is well structured definitely my favourite substack atm!
I copied one paragraph and replaced some bits. Does it sound correct ?
The Ameirican banking system (circa 2008) needs to stop thinking about foreign capital - and the foreign investors (Japan, Germany etc.) behind it - as marks to be ripped off and dumb money to plug gaps (in "AAA" rated junk MBS, CDO etc). It might be fun to stick foreigners with the losses from Countrywide mortgage (goldman's Abacus CDO etc.), but............
I hope i have not misunderstood anything. But yeah, i get that the dragon is no match for the eagle for lots of good reasons, many of which you have mentioned.
I'm speaking about the distinction between onshore and offshore debt holders. In the examples you sighted, foreign investors saw the same losses as domestic investors in those products, and in many cases the senior bond holders often took losses.
Further, foreign investors ended up taking stakes in the failed financial institutions in the manner I describe in the post. The banks were recapped as a result.
Meanwhile, Evergrande's onshore debt still hasn't been written down.
Do you see the distinction here?
Wouldn't the US be better off if they were not the issuer of the reserve currency and still maintain open capital markets? Doesn't the reserve currency create a form of 'dutch disease' for their manufacturing sector? Or is the reserve currency status something that cannot be controlled because like you say it is a matter of trust and network effects that the US cannot control? Cheers.
Careful. You might get hired by the White House. Or perhaps the CIA.
Thoroughly enjoyed this mate, good read can feel how deeply you've considered this and the writing is well structured definitely my favourite substack atm!
All this was the right prescription for China from the beginning.
But China is not at the beginning.
Awesome article! Learned a lot.
Thank you
Thanks again
Data Q: Any idea why the FRED Eurodollar series was discontinued?
(When libor->sofr happened they also sadly stopped publishing IRS)
no idea, spent a while trying to track it down too